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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that 
children who voluntarily assume responsibility for renting and 
managing the home of a mentally incompetent parent have no duty to 
maintain the premises in a safe condition. 
The issue presents a mixed question of law and fact. The 
standard of review on summary judgment requires that all facts and 
inferences be construed in favor of the party against whom summary 
judgment was entered. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; 
Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982); Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982); Beehive Brick Co. v. 
Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah App. 1988) . Questions 
of law are reviewed for correctness and the trial court's rulings 
are accorded no deference. Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake 
City, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). [Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dated April 15, 1997; Transcript of hearing on 
motion for summary judgment, dated May 12, 1997, p. 15.] [Record, 
pp. 583-92, 731.] 
II. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding on 
summary judgment that the defendants could not have discovered 
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through ordinary care the defective condition of the window in 
question. 
The standard of review on summary judgment requires that all 
facts and inferences be construed in favor of the party against 
whom summary judgment was entered. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 56; Jackson v. Dabnev, supra; Bowen v. Riverton City, supra; 
Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., supra. [Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment, dated April 15, 1997; Transcript of 
hearing on motion for summary judgment, dated May 12, 1997, p. 
15.] [Record, pp. 583-92, 731.] 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. (A copy of Rule 56 is 
attached as Addendum, Exhibit "C") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Monica Robles was injured at the premises located at 728 
North Redwood Road, Salt Lake City Utah (the "Premises"). The 
injury occurred when Mrs. Robles attempted to open a window (the 
"Window in Question") at the Premises. Due to the deteriorated 
condition of the Window in Question, the glass in the Window in 
Question shattered when Mrs. Robles tried to open it. 
The deteriorated condition of the Window in Question, making 
it difficult or impossible to open, was a hazardous condition at 
the Premises which was easily detectable upon inspection. Thus, 
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the defendants Janice Dent and James Bolton should have easily 
discovered and addressed the dangerous condition. 
Janice Dent and James Bolton exercised full responsibility 
for the Premises. They rented the home, performed maintenance and 
repairs, and conducted all other business with respect to the 
house. They made all decisions and took all action without ever 
consulting with their mother Evelyn Bolton, whom they had placed 
in a full-time care situation due to her mental impairment. 
Pursuant to defendants' motion for summary judgment, this 
matter was heard by the Trial Court on May 12, 1997. Summary 
judgment was granted as against plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The disputed and undisputed material facts presented to the 
trial on defendant's motion for summary judgment, and which are 
relevant to this appeal, consisted of the following: 
1. Commencing in 1990, defendants James Bolton and Janice 
Dent moved their mother into a full-time care situation due to her 
mental impairment. Thereafter, James Bolton and Janice Dent 
exercised all control over the Premises. [Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated April 15, 1997 
(hereinafter "Opposition"), pp. 3-4; Defendants' Responses to 
Requests for Admissions (hereinafter "Admissions"), nos. 2-67; 
Deposition of James Bolton; Deposition of Janice Dent.] [Record, 
pp. 530-56, 585-86, 589-614.] 
3 
2* Monica Robles was injured on October 1, 1993. 
[Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
dated April 4, 1997, pp. 3, 7; Opposition, p. 3.] [Record, pp. 
472, 476, 585.] 
3. James Bolton and Janice Dent maintained exclusive 
responsibility and control of the Premises. [Opposition, pp. 3-4; 
Admissions, nos. 2-67; Deposition of James Bolton; Deposition of 
Janice Dent.] [Record, pp. 530-56, 585-86, 589-614.] They managed 
all aspects of the Premises and never consulted with their mother 
with respect thereto. [Opposition, pp. 3-4; Admissions, nos. 2-
18, 26-27; Deposition of James Bolton; Deposition of Janice Dent.] 
[Record, pp. 530-56, 585-86, 589-606.] It is doubtful that their 
mother ever knew anything concerning the rental of the Premises. 
[Opposition, pp. 3-4; Admissions, nos. 2-18, 26-27; Deposition of 
James Bolton; Deposition of Janice Dent.] [Record, pp. 530-56, 
585-86, 589-606.] 
4. Monica Robles was injured when she attempted to open the 
Window in Question. She was able to open the Window in Question 
slightly. However, on further effort, the glass in the Window in 
Question shattered, causing her injury. No one had ever indicated 
to her that she should not open the Window in Question or that 
there was any reason she could not open the Window in Question. 
[Opposition, pp. 4-5; Deposition of Monica Robles, pp. 36-41] 
[Record, pp. 562-63, 586-87.] 
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5- The condition of the Window in Question constituted a 
dangerous condition. The Window in Question was old and rotted 
and difficult or impossible to open. [Opposition, p. 5; 
Deposition of Monica Robles, pp. 3 6-41; Deposition of Adolfo 
Robles, pp. 53-64.] [Record, pp. 562-63, 5871.] In addition to 
the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Robles, who were eye witnesses to 
the dangerous condition of the window, plaintiffs advised the 
Court of their intention to use an expert witness at trial to 
further illuminate the problem. [Transcript of hearing on motion 
for summary judgment, dated May 12, 1997, p. 18.] [Record, p. 
734.] 
6. James Bolton and Janice Dent could have easily known of 
the problem with the Window in Question. James Bolton testified 
that he did not remember ever inspecting the Window in Question or 
trying to open the Window in Question before the accident. He 
only remembers opening the Window in Question after it was 
repaired by Mr. Robles. Notwithstanding, there was an obvious 
problem with the Window in Question prior to the accident. 
1
 The deposition of Adolfo Robles was taken April 7, 1997. The 
transcript was not received by plaintiff until after plaintiff's 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed. 
Defendants indicated in their brief that they intended to file the 
transcript. However, since the transcript was not filed and is 
not part of the official record, a copy has instead been attached 
hereto as an exhibit for the convenience of this Court. The 
testimony of Mr. Robles was proffered to the Trial Court in oral 
argument. See Transcript of hearing on motion for summary 
judgment, dated May 12, 1997, p. 18. [Record, p. 734.] 
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[Defendants' Responses to Requests for Admissions, nos. 45-46; 
Deposition of James Bolton, pp. 29, 58-60; Deposition of Adolfo 
Robles, pp. 53-64; Transcript of hearing on motion for summary 
judgment, dated May 12, 1997, p. 18.] [Record, pp. 562-63, 587, 
734.] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court made two improper findings as the basis for 
granting summary judgment. First, the Trial Court determined that 
the defendants did not have a duty to maintain the Premises in a 
safe condition. It could be said that the facts constituted a 
matter for the jury. However, in this case it was actually 
undisputed by the defendants that they were the sole persons 
taking full responsibility for every aspect of the rental of the 
Premises. Contrary to the legal authorities, the Trial Court 
determined that since the defendants "voluntarily" assumed that 
responsibility, that for some reason they had no liability for 
their actions. 
Summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for 
trial. The evidence clearly establishes that the defendants were 
the landlords of this property. No other potentially liable party 
had even an awareness of the rental of the property. Under the 
facts, the law places a duty upon these defendants to maintain the 
Premises in a safe condition. 
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Second, the Trial Court found that the defendants did not 
know of the defect in question and that they had no reason to 
know. Contrary to the Court's finding, the correct standard is 
whether or not the landlord could have discovered that a dangerous 
condition existed in the exercise of due care. Again, this is a 
factual matter for the jury. Mr. and Mrs. Robles, both 
eyewitnesses to the condition of the Window in Question, both 
testified as to sufficient facts as to permit the jury to 
determine that the defendants could have discovered the defect in 
the exercise of due care. The facts would have been further 
illuminated by expert witness testimony at trial. 
Again, summary judgment must be reversed and the case 
remanded for trial. Construed in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff, Mrs. Robles clearly has the opportunity to prevail in 
her action. 
ARGUMENT 
I, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT CHILDREN WHO VOLUNTARILY ASSUME 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR RENTING AND MANAGING THE HOME 
OF A MENTALLY INCOMPETENT PARENT HAVE NO DUTY 
TO MAINTAIN THE PREMISES IN A SAFE CONDITION, 
Defendants owed a duty to maintain the Premises in a safe 
condition. The facts of the case were that James Bolton and 
Janice Dent were the individuals who exercised all control over 
the Premises, as set forth in the Statement of Facts, above. 
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Plaintiff presented two doctrines of law establishing the duty of 
defendants under the facts. 
First, both plaintiff and defendants cited case law to 
establish that a person who has assumed day to day authority for 
control of property owes a duty to maintain the premises in a safe 
condition, and that when a party has taken responsibility from the 
owner for day to day control, the duty of the owner ceases. See 
Tisdale v. U.S., 838 F.Supp. 592 (N.D. Ga 1993); Harris v. U.S., 
424 F.Supp. 627 (D.Mass. 1976); McFeelv v. U.S., 700 F.Supp. 414 
(S.D.Ind. 1988); Miller v. Zeo. Mfg. Co., 815 P.2d 506 (Kan. 
1991). [Record, pp. 489-490, 589.] 
Second, plaintiff cited authority to establish that an agent 
is responsible for his own negligence, regardless of the co-
liability of his master. Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 
27 Utah 2d 109, 493 P.2d 625, 627 (1972) (master and agent both 
liable for negligence of agent); Krukewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 
1349 (Utah 1986). [Record, pp. 589-590.] The Restatement Second 
of the law of Agency, section 354, provides: 
An agent who, by promise or otherwise, undertakes to act for 
his principal under such circumstances that some action is 
necessary for the protection of the person or tangible things 
of another, is subject to liability to the other for physical 
harm to him or to his things caused by the reliance of the 
principal or of the other upon his undertaking and his 
subsequent unexcused failure to act, if such failure creates 
an unreasonable risk of harm to him and the agent should so 
realize. 
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Comment a. provides in part, "by undertaking a job a person 
prevents others from undertaking it, since the principal relies 
upon him to perform it." Illustration no. 2 to comment b. even 
includes an example of an agent who negligently failed to inspect 
or repair a window! [Record, p. 590.] 
Neither plaintiff nor defendant proffered any argument for 
the premise upon which the trial court based its rulirig. 
Plaintiff is unaware of any authority that could be used to 
establish that if children voluntarily undertake to act on behalf 
of a mentally incompetent parent in renting and managing her 
property, then the children do not owe a duty of care equal to the 
duty of care which would be owed by anyone else who had undertaken 
full responsibility for such property management or was otherwise 
acting as an agent with responsibility therefore. 
Based on the undisputed facts, and particularly when the 
facts are construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the 
evidence firmly established that the defendants James Bolton and 
Janice Dent exercised exclusive control over the Premises. [For 
references to the Record, see Statement of Facts, paragraph nos. 1 
and 3, above.] 
It was undisputed that Evelyn Bolton was moved into a full-
time care situation by James Bolton and Janice Dent due to her 
mental impairment. [See Statement of Facts, paragraph no. 1, 
above.] She never knew anything concerning the rental of the 
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Premises. [See Statement of Facts, paragraph no. 3, above.] 
James Bolton and Janice Dent assumed exclusive control of the 
Premises when they placed their mother into a full-time care 
situation due to her mental condition. [See Statement of Facts, 
paragraph nos. 1 and 3, above.] Thereafter, they rented the 
Premises and assumed all authority and responsibility for the 
Premises. [See Statement of Facts, paragraph nos. 1 and 3, 
above.] With respect to all rentals, James Bolton and Janice Dent 
did not consult with or report to their mother. [See Statement of 
Facts, paragraph no. 3, above.] They have no recollection of even 
a single discussion with their mother concerning the rental of the 
Premises. [See Statement of Facts, paragraph nos. 1 and 3, 
above. ] 
No one other than James Bolton and Janice Dent exercised any 
authority to control the Premises. [See Statement of Facts, 
paragraph nos. 1 and 3, above.] James Bolton and Janice Dent 
rented the Premises and made all decisions with respect thereto 
without reporting to anyone. [See Statement of Facts, paragraph 
nos. 1 and 3, above.] 
As between plaintiff and defendants, the law was undisputed. 
If the facts were construed such that defendants had assumed 
control for the day to day management of the Premises, then 
defendants would owe a duty of care in the present circumstances. 
[Record, p. 489.] 
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Based on the additional authority cited by plaintiff, 
defendants would also owe a duty of care if the facts revealed 
that they acted as the agent of the owner of the Premises. 
Construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the 
facts establish such liability. James Bolton and Janice Dent must 
be held to be the parties with responsibility for the Premises. 
To find otherwise would mean that no one was responsible for the 
Premises. 
As a matter of law, all facts and reasonable inferences must 
be construed in favor of plaintiff. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 56; Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 
1982); Bowen v. Riverton Citv, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982); 
Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah 
App. 1988). [Record, p. 54-55.] 
Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that James Bolton 
and Janice Dent had voluntarily assumed management and control of 
the Premises for their mentally incompetent mother and in holding 
on that basis that defendants owed no duty of care. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
COULD NOT HAVE DISCOVERED THROUGH ORDINARY CARE 
THE DEFECTIVE CONDITION OF THE WINDOW IN QUESTION. 
Utah law imposes upon the person responsible for rental 
property a burden of maintaining the property in safe condition. 
See Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 
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App. 1993); Krukewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349, supra; Williams v. 
Melbv, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). [Record, pp. 488, 591.] 
Negligence is imposed when the "landlord" knew or in the 
exercise of ordinary care should have known that a dangerous 
condition existed and failed to take corrective action. Gregory v. 
Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1988); Martin 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Utah 1997). 
[Record, pp. 493-94, 591.] 
A window that will not open properly may be determined to be 
a dangerous condition as a matter of law. See the Restatement 
Second of the law of Agency, section 354, comment b., illustration 
no. 2. At the very least, whether or not a window that will not 
open properly constitutes a dangerous condition is a question of 
fact for the jury. See Williams v. Melby, supra, at 727. 
In the present case, the Window in Question was extremely 
difficult to open. [See Statement of Facts, paragraph no. 5, 
above.] It could be opened slightly and was opened slightly by 
tenants from time to time due to the humidity caused by the 
neighboring bathroom shower. [See Statement of Facts, paragraph 
no. 5, above.] The dangerous condition of the Window in Question 
was apparent on the basis of a mere cursory inspection. [See 
Statement of Facts, paragraph no. 5, above.] The dangerous 
condition was an obvious and patent defect, not a latent defect. 
Both plaintiff and her former husband Adolfo Robles had provided 
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deposition testimony and were prepared to provide further 
testimony. [See Statement of Facts, paragraph no. 5, above.] That 
testimony, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, 
would have established that the Window represented a dangerous 
condition, and that the dangerous condition was easily 
discoverable upon even a cursory investigation. [See Statement of 
Facts, paragraph nos. 5 and 6, above.] 
In Williams v. Melbv, supra. 699 P.2d 723, 728, the Supreme 
Court stated, "If a reasonably prudent person should have known or 
could have learned by exercise of reasonable care, that the design 
or construction of the window constituted a dangerous condition, 
the landlord could be held liable for not taking adequate safety 
precautions." The Supreme Court also cited Becker v. IRM Corp., 
144 Cal.App.3d 321, 192 Cal.Rptr. 570 (1983) in which, "The 
difference between tempered glass and untempered glass was 
discernable only on close inspection. The Court set aside summary 
judgment because the case presented a factual issue as to whether 
the landlord could have learned of the defective condition of the 
property." Id. 
Plaintiffs have further evidence that they intend to use at 
trial, consisting of expert testimony and a video tape of efforts 
to open the Window. Discovery was not closed at the time that 
summary judgment was entered, and plaintiffs would have been 
permitted to introduce this evidence at trial. Plaintiffs alerted 
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the Court to the existence of the expert witness and the 
investigation and conclusions of the expert witness. [Transcript 
of hearing on motion for summary judgment, dated May 12, 1997, p. 
18.] [Record, p. 734.] 
James Bolton and Janice Dent testified to their basic neglect 
as to the condition of the Premises. [See Statement of Facts, 
paragraph no. 6, above.] They knew very well that the home was 
old and not in good condition. Within the approximately three 
years prior to the accident, James Bolton and Janice Dent had 
rented to Premises to five different parties. [Defendants' 
Supplemental responses to discovery, dated November 17, 1995, 
response to interrogatory no. 15.] [Record, p. 522.] 
Kad James Bolton and Janice Dent exercised ordinary care in 
inspecting and maintaining the Premises, they would have easily 
discovered the dangerous condition of the Window in Question. Had 
they done no more than nail the window shut, the accident to Mrs. 
Robles could have been prevented. 
As a matter of law, all facts and reasonable inferences must 
be construed in favor of plaintiff. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 56; Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 
1982); Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982); 
Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah 
App. 1988). [Record, p. 54-55.] 
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Therefore, the trial court erred in finding on summary 
judgment that the defendants could not have discovered through 
ordinary care the defective condition of the window in question. 
CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as James Bolton and Janice Dene were the only 
persons managing the premises, they owed a duty of care as a 
matter of law. The jury must determine whether or not the duty of 
care was breached. Construed in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff, James Bolton and Janice Dent were clearly negligent. 
Plaintiff and Appellant Monica Robles respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the summary judgment granred by the Trial 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this f / day of February, 1998. 
-l/tr1 y-
Thor B. Roundy ~C 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONICA ROBLES, an individual, 
ADOLFO ROBLES, an individual, 
and MONICA ROBLES, as guardian 
ad litem for VICTORIA ROBLES, 
a minor child, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILLIAM L. BOLTON, an individ-
ual, JANICE BOLTON DENT, an 
individual, and JAMES E. BOLTON, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 950901997 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The Motion for Summary Judgment and the Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Adolfo Robles 
and Victoria Robles, both motions being filed by defendants, were heard by the court on Monday, 
May 12, 1997. The plaintiffs were represented by counsel, Thor B. Roundy, who presented oral 
argument on their behalf, and defendants were represented by counsel, Peter H. Christensen, who 
gM-.l-W 
presented oral argument on their behalf The court also received and considered written memoranda 
submitted by the parties, and accompanying exhibits and affidavits on both of the aforementioned 
motions. Having considered the oral arguments, legal memoranda, affidavits and exhibits submitted 
by all the parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Adolfo Robles and Victoria Robles is 
granted. 
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
3. The trial date of May 27-30, 1997 is hereby stricken. 
4. The plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice 
DATED this 3 ° day of May, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
-^Y-f-TK^ 
/ Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson 
s \htigate\sjt\bolton adv robles\pleadings\Order to Dismiss(l 750 271) -2-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: DIVISION I 
MONICA ROBLES, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
ADOLFO ROBLES, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
AND MONICA ROBLES, AS 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR VICTORIA 
ROBLES, A MINOR CHILD, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS 
WILLIAM L. BOLTON, AN 
INDIVIDUAL, JANICE BOLTON 
DENT, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND 
JAMES E. BOLTON, AN 
INDIVIDUAL, 
DEFENDANTS. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' 
RENEWED MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS CLAIMS OF ADOLFO 
AND VICTORIA ROBLES 
CASE NO. 950901997 
HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 12TH DAY OF 
MAY, 1997, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN 
COURTROOM NO. 502 OF THE COURTS BUILDING, METROPOLITAN HALL 
OF JUSTICE, 240 EAST 400 SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
THOR B. ROUNDY. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, 230 SOUTH 
500 EAST, SUITE 270, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102, TELEPHONE 
364-3229, APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
PETER H. CHRISTENSEN, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, 
STRONG & HANNI, SIXTH FLOOR, BOSTON BUILDING, SALT LAKE 
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1 CITY, UTAH 84111, TELEPHONE 532-7080, APPEARING ON BEHALF 
2 II OF DEFENDANTS. 
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(WHEREUPON, THK, FOLLOWING PROCEEDING.", WERE 
HAD IN OPEN COURT:) 
THE COURT: THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT IS 
THE CASE OF MON '•"•• F*nRT.ES VERSUS WILLIAM BOLTON. THIS 
COMES BEFORE THE COURT ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, I GUESS A MOTION TO DISMISS ALSO. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY PROCEED. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
YOUR HONOR, I AM REPRESENTING DEFEK •.:...- WE 
HAVE TWO MOTIONS, BOTH FOR DISPOSITION: '.rib FIRST ONE 
BEING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND THE SECOND BEING A 
".OTION Tu DISMISS THE CLAIMS OF ADOLFO AND VICTORIA ROBLES. 
WE HAVE THREE PARTIES. WE HAVE THREE 
PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION. ONE IS MONICA ROBLES, WHO IS 
HE INJURED PARTY. SHE ALLEGEDLY WAS INJURED, INJURED HER 
HAND, WHEN SHE OPENED A WINDOW AND GLASS BROKE AND INJURED 
THE HAND. 
THE OTHER TWO INDIVIDUALS, ADOLFO IS THE EX-
HUSBAND OF MONICA ROBLES; AND VICTORIA IS THE MINOR 
DAUGHTER. 
IF I COULD FIRST ADDRESS THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THIS, YOUR HONOR, IS THE THIRD TIME THIS 
HAS BEEN FILED, AND ON "" ' "•>' 
ORDERED THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ALLOWED TO DO ADDITIONAL 
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1 DISCOVERY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT FACTS 
2 TO DENY SUMMARY JUDGMENT. AND THAT DISCOVERY HAS NOT BEEN 
3 DONE. 
4 THEREFORE, WE BROUGHT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
5 BACK TO THE COURT. THIS CASE PRESENTLY IS SET FOR TRIAL 
6 FOR THE LAST WEEK OF THIS MONTH IN FRONT OF THE COURT FOR 
7 AN ENTIRE WEEK, FOR FOUR DAYS. 
8 LET ME FIRST ADDRESS THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
9 JUDGMENT. THERE ARE THREE ARGUMENTS IN THE MOTION FOR '' 
10 SUMMARY JUDGMENT. FIRST OF ALL, THE DEFENDANT DID NOT OWN 
11 THE PROPERTY. SECONDLY, THAT THEY DID NOT POSSESS OR HAVE 
12 SUFFICIENT CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY TO BE LIABLE. AND THEN 
13 THIRD, THE THIRD ARGUMENT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IS THAT IF 
14 THEY ARE FOUND TO EITHER HAVE OWNED OR HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT 
15 CONTROL OVER THE PROPERTY TO BE LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S, 
16 THEN, NO. 3, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF DEFECT THAT CAUSED THE 
17 INJURY, OR AT LEAST "THERE WAS A DEFECT THAT THEY KNEW ABOUT 
18 OR REASONABLY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN ABOUT. 
19 AND BEFORE I GO FURTHER, I BELIEVE COUNSEL 
20 HAS TENTATIVELY STIPULATED THAT ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS, 
21 WILLIAM BOLTON, CAN BE LET OUT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
22 MR. ROUNDY: YES, THAT'S FINE WITH US. 
23 WE'RE NOT GOING TO PUT A CLAIM AGAINST HIM. 
24 MR. CHRISTENSEN: THAT ONLY LEAVES TWO 
25 DEFENDANTS, WHO ARE JANICE BOLTON DENT AND JAMES BOLTON. 
I'- ; .-.MM.!"' EXPIJUN TO THE '''^ ,'RT WHO THEY 
• ,-i..L • ACCIDENT HAPPENED ON OCTOBER 1, 
THE PLAINTIFF HAD HER HUSBAND, OR EX-HUSBAND, AND 
DAUGHTER WERE STAYING WITH SOME PEOPLE CALLED THE 
ESCALANTES IN A HOME THAT WAS OWNED BY EVELYN BOLTON. 
NOW EVELYN BOLTON IS THE ELDERLY MOTHER OF 
JAMES BOLTON AND JANICE BOLT'W I'UN'1' AND TUF V ARE BROTHER 
AND SISTER. 
NOW IT IS ON THE DATE OF OCTOBER . ^ 3 , 
EVELYN BOLTON OWNED THIS HOUSE. ,: • '. .V.' ] ;-. l)ECtMH£P OF 
AFTER THE ACCIDENT. AFTER SHE DIED, IT CAME TO THE 
ATTENTION OF JAMES BOLTON AND JANICE BOLTON DENT THAT A 
WARRANTY DEED HAD BEEN EXECUTED SOME YEARS BEFORE CONVEYING 
PROPERTY TO THE CHILDREN, BUT THERE'S BEEN NO EVIDENCE 
PRODUCED THAT SHOWS THAT THEY KNEW ABOUT THIS WARRANTY 
DEF!, THAT THKY HAD POSSESSION OK THIS WARRANTY DEED ON THE 
DATE OF THE ACCIDENT, OR BEFORE THEIR MOTHER'S DEATH 
APPROXIMATELY A MONTH LATER. 
WE'VE CITED CA'Jh] LAW IN OUR BRIEF WHICH 
ASSERTS THAT A WARRANTY DEED IS NOT EFFECTIVE UNTIL IT'S 
TRANSFERRED, AND IT'S UNDISPUTED THAT THE TRANSFER DID NOT 
':•->:• , -. DECEMBER OF 1993, AFTER THE ACCIDENT. AND 
THEREFORE, ON THE DATE OF THE LOSS, NEITHER OF THESE TWO 
DEFENDANTS OWNED THE PROPERTY. 
NOW THIS COURT, ON A PRIOR OCCASION, ALLOWED 
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1 THE PLAINTIFF TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT AND BRING A CLAIM 
2 AGAINST EVELYN BOLTON. THIS COURT ULTIMATELY RULED THAT 
3 THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN ON BEING ABLE TO PURSUE 
4 THAT CLAIM AGAINST EVELYN BOLTON'S ESTATE. SO EVELYN 
5 BOLTON OR HER ESTATE IS NOT A PARTY TO THIS LAWSUIT. 
6 NOW IF THEY DIDN'T OWNED THE PROPERTY ON THE 
7 DATE OF THE ACCIDENT, YOUR HONOR, THE ONLY WAY THEY COULD 
8 BE LIABLE IS IF THEY HAD SUFFICIENT CONTROL OR POSSESSION 
9 OF THIS PROPERTY TO MAKE THEM LIABLE. 
10 WE'VE CITED CASES IN OUR BRIEF, SPECIFICALLY 
11 TISDALVE VS. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. IT SHOWS THAT AN 
12 OWNER IS NO LONGER LIABLE IF IT CONTRACTS THE DAY-TO-DAY 
13 MANAGEMENT OF THE PROPERTY TO ANOTHER PARTY. ONCE THAT 
14 PARTY ACCEPTS THAT CONTRACT, AND TAKES OVER AS AN 
15 INDEPENDENT CONTRACT, THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PROPERTY, THEN 
16 AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR THEY BECOME LIABLE, IF THEY 
17 HAD FULL AUTHORITY AND CONTROL OVER THE PROPERTY. 
18 I THINK IT'S SAFE TO SAY, YOUR HONOR, THAT 
19 THE FACTS IN THIS CASE SHOW THAT MS. BOLTON WAS QUITE OLD. 
20 PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT SHE HAD MOVED OUT TO WHERE SHE COULD 
21 BE IN A PLACE WHERE SHE COULD BE SUFFICIENTLY CARED FOR, 
22 AND THAT LEFT AN EMPTY HOME. 
23 HER TWO CHILDREN, JANICE DENT BOLTON, WHO 
24 LIVED I THINK ESSENTIALLY ACROSS THE STREET, AND JAMES 
25 BOLTON, THEY VOLUNTEERED ESSENTIALLY TO—THEY TOOK IT UPON 
THEMSELVES, WITHOUT REALLY ANY ppr~^ THAT mTITS 
2 II COMMUNICATION WAS WITH THEIR MOTHEP , '10 GV • PERMISSION TO 
3 DO THIS, TO MAINTAIN THE PROPERTY n>C 7"-"-'
 i r WOULDN'T BE 
4||TAI-MI uVhh hi VANDALS, Sn I'I WOU:.i '. . A M APART. 
WHAT THEY DID IS THEY ALLOWED THEIR LOCAL 
6 || BISHOP TO HAVE PEOPLE MOVE IN WHO NEEDED A PLACE TO STAY. 
7 THEi ALLOWED RELATIVES SUCH AS MR. BOLTON'S SON AND ONE OF 
8 II HIS SON'S FRIENDS TO MOVE IN AND LIVE IN THIS HOUSE. 
THE RENT THEREFORE—THERE WAS NEVER ANY 
10 LANDLORD-TENANT AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO WITH THESE PEOPLE; 
1 iEVER ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT ENTERED. 
1. TrV i-ENT WENT DIRECTLY '!\) EVELYN Bui,TON':, 
13 || ACCOUNT. MOST (.V THESE TENANTS WOULD PAY THE RENT 
THEMSELVES DIRECTLY TO THE ACCOUNT. 
O II •' OCCASIONALLY, WHKN THEY WERE I ATE OR THKY 
16 NEEDED TO, THEY WOULD RUN IT ACROSS THE STREET TO EVELYN—I 
17 MEAN TO JANICE BOLTON. 
18 AS FAR AS MAINTENANCE, THERE WAS VERY LITTLE 
19 MAINTENANCE DONE ON IT. 
20 JAMES BOLTON, IT'S BEEN SHOWN THROUGH 
21 DISCOVERY, WOULD OCCASIONALLY DO THE MAINTENANCE HIMSELF. 
22 I THINK HE CHANGED HEATERS, HE CHANGED A SHOWER, FIXED THE 
23 SHOWER. IF THERE WAS SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT, EITHER JAMES 
24 || -.N. ,r. WERE ASKED BY THE TENANTS, WOULD HAVE A 
25 PROFESSIONAL PLUMBER OR ELECTRICIAN, WHOEVER WAS NEEDED TO 
COME IN AND DO REPAIRS ON THE PROPERTY. 
THEY NEVER RECEIVED ANY COMPENSATION FOR 
THIS. WHEN THEIR DEPOSITIONS WERE TAKEN, I THINK IT WAS 
CLEAR THAT THEY HAD VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE 
PEOPLE THAT WERE IN THERE, BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T HAVE MUCH 
INVOLVEMENT WITH THEM, AND WE DON'T THINK THEIR ACTIONS 
ROSE TO THE LEVEL OF BEING INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS WHO HAD 
FULL AUTHORITY OVER THE DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF THIS 
PROPERTY. 
I THINK IT'S MORE ALONG THE LINES OF 
CHILDREN ASSISTING THEIR MOTHER, VOLUNTEERING TO ASSIST 
THEIR MOTHER AS MUCH AS THEY COULD IN THEIR BUSY SCHEDULES 
TO TRY TO MAINTAIN THIS PIECE OF PROPERTY. 
NOW THE PLAINTIFFS ALSO ARGUE THAT THERE'S 
LIABILITY IF THEY'RE NOT OWNERS, AND THEN THE PLAINTIFF 
ARGUES THAT THEY HAD SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER IT TO BE 
LIABLE OR THEY WERE AGENTS. 
AND AS AGENTS, YOU'RE LIABLE FOR YOUR OWN 
ACTIONS AS WELL AS THE PRINCIPAL'S LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF 
THE AGENTS. 
HOWEVER, I THINK IT'S CLEAR UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUR HONOR, THAT THE LAW, ESPECIALLY THE 
RESTATEMENT, FOR THERE TO BE AGENCY, AN AGENCY 
RELATIONSHIP, THE PRINCIPAL MUST MANIFEST CONSENT THAT THE 
AGENT ACTED ON THE PRINCIPAL'S BEHALF. 
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1 THERE IS NO PROOF OF THAT HERE. THERE IS 
2 II NO WK DON'T HAVE ANY EVIDENCE, BECAUSE EVELYN BOLTON'S NO 
3 LONGER ALIVE, AS TO WHAT SHE KNEW ABOUT WHAT HER CHILDREN 
4 WERE DOING, THAT SHE ASKED HER CHILDREN TO COME IN .AND DO 
5 THIS FOR HER. 
6 THIS REALLY IS A SITUATION WHERE THEY WERE 
7 ASSISTING HER, AND THERE IS NO PROOF OF AGENCY 
8 RELATIONSHIP, YOUR HONOR, THAT WOULD MAKE THESE CHILDREN 
9 LIABLE ON THAT BASIS. THEY WERE VOLUNTEERS. 
10 NOW ASSUMING THAT THEY WERE OWNERS, ASSUMING 
11 THAT THE COURT FINDS THAT, ASSUMING THAT--OR, THAT THEY HAD 
12 SUFFICIENT CONTROL THAT THEY WOULD BE LIABLE FOR INJURY TO 
13 MONICA ROBLES, IT STILL HAS TO BE ESTABLISHED BY MONICA 
14 ROBLES THAT THERE WAS A DEFECT IN THIS WINDOW; THAT THE 
15 DEFENDANT'S TWO CHILDREN KNEW ABOUT THE DEFECT, OR 
16 REASONABLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISCOVER THE DEFECT. 
17 . WE CITED IN OUR BRIEF THE CASE OF GREGORY 
18 VS. FOURTHWEST. ESSENTIALLY IN THAT CASE THERE WAS AN 
19 AWNING OVER SOME PROPERTY THAT HAD SNOW ON IT. THE AWNING 
20 BROKE AND INJURED A THIRD PARTY WHO PROCEEDED TO SUE THE 
21 OWNER. 
22 CERTAINLY THE FACT THAT THERE WAS SNOW ON 
23 THE AWNING, AND THAT IT BROKE, WAS FOUND BY JUDGE HANSON 
24 NOT TO HAVE CREATED LIABILITY. THEPF "' ~ m~ BF PROOF AS TO 
25 WHY THE AWNING BROKE, AND NO PROOF W.A' KJT FORTH. 
IN THAT CASE, IT SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW, OR IN 
EXERCISE OF ORDINARY CARE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN, THAT A 
DANGEROUS CONDITION EXISTED AND SUFFICIENT TIME ELAPSE TO 
TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION. 
IN THIS CASE, WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT WHAT 
HAPPENED? WE KNOW THAT MONICA ROBLES WENT TO THIS WINDOW. 
SHE PARTICULARLY—NOT EVEN A TENANT IN THE PROPERTY—SHE 
JUST WAS INVITED IN BY PEOPLE, BY THE ESCALANTES, WHO WERE 
KNOWN TO BE TENANTS, TO LIVE WITH THEM UNTIL THEY COULD— 
UNTIL THE ROBLESES COULD GET ON THEIR FEET. SHE GOES TO 
THIS WINDOW AND SHE SAID SHE'S OPENING IT FROM BELOW, AND 
ALL OF A SUDDEN SHE HEARS AN EXPLOSION. 
SHE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT THE EXPLOSION IS. 
INITIALLY SHE LOOKS INTO THE NEXT ROOM TO SEE WHERE THE 
EXPLOSION IS, "IS HER DAUGHTER ALL RIGHT?" 
THEN SHE SEES BLOOD ON HER HAND. WELL, WE 
KNOW ULTIMATELY, YOUR HONOR, THAT THE GLASS BROKE. THE 
PANE BROKE AND CUT HER HAND. 
WHY IT BROKE, WE DON'T KNOW. THE PLAINTIFF 
IS TRYING TO ARGUE THAT THE HUSBAND, ADOLFO ROBLES, KNOWS. 
HE WASN'T THERE. HE FIXED IT A WEEK LATER. 
IF HE'S NOT THERE, HE CAN'T KNOW WHY THE 
WINDOW BROKE. HE CAN'T KNOW WHETHER IT BROKE BECAUSE OF 
THE WAY SHE WAS OPENING IT. I CAN'T KNOW IF IT BROKE 
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I'M W I 'nil.' liKKECT IS, 'I'UhN AT THE MINIMUM IT'S A 
LATENT DEFECT THAT THEY'RE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR. 
I CAN FINISH BY GOING TO THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS. THE MOTION ' ':... :. . PECIFICALLY AGAINST 
ADOLFO AND VICTORIA ROBLES. THERE'S SOME DISPUTE THAT 
NEITHER OF THOSE TWO PARTIES WERE INJURED IN THIS ACCIDENT. 
ADOLFO WASN'T PRESENT AT THE HOME. VICTORIA ROBLES, THE 
MINOR, WAS IN THE NEXT ROOM. 
NOW* HOW CAN THERE BE LIABILITY, HOW CAN THEY 
HAVE A CLAIM? ONE WAY THEY CAN HAVE A CLAIM IS IN THE 
THEORY WHICH THE PLAINTIFF MAS CLAIMED WHICH WAS LOSS OF 
CONSORTIUM, IF THAT THE<~: • . IN THE .STATE OF UTAH AT 
THIS TIME, AND IT DIDN"; I HIS OCCURRED IN OCTOBER, 
OCTOBER 1, 1993. 
IN THEIK ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES, THEY ARE 
SPECIFICALLY ASKED, "WHAT'S THE BASIS OF THE CLAIM OF THESE 
TWO DEFENDANTS?" 
- AND THE ANSWER WAS, "LOSS OF CONSORTIUM." 
ADOLFO ROBLES CLAIMED IN HIS DEPOSITION, I 
ASKED HIM, "WHAT ARE YOUR DAMAGES FROM THIS? WERE YOU 
INJURED?" "NO." 
"WHAT ARE YOUR DAMAGES?" 
"' HA!' n,C rl\'- MEDICAL BILLS. MY 
f.r K 'i"P " 
NWHAT I S YOUR DAUGHTER' S CLAIM?' 
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1 "WELL, SHE DIDN'T HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH 
2 HER MOTHER THAT SHE SHOULD HAVE HAD." THAT IS A LOT OF 
3 CONSORTIUM. 
4 PACKER V. UTAH POWER & LIGHT, THAT CASE 
5 SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT THERE IS NO LOSS OF CONSORTIUM IN 
6 THE STATE OF UTAH. YOU CAN'T RECOVER UNDER THAT THEORY. 
7 IF I COULD QUOTE: 
8 "THERE SHALL BE NO RIGHT OF RECOVERY BY 
9 A HUSBAND ON ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL INJURY 
10 OR WRONG TO HIS WIFE." 
11 NOW IF THERE WAS SUCH A THEORY IN THIS STATE AT THE TIME OF 
12 THIS ACCIDENT, THEN I WOULD—THE QUESTION I WOULD ASK IS: 
13 WHY DID THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUST RECENTLY PASS 
14 HOUSE BILL NO. 320 WHICH SPECIFICALLY GIVES A SPOUSE A 
15 CLAIM FOR INJURY. 
16 I MEAN--AND EXCUSE ME, GIVES A SPOUSE A 
17 CLAIM OF LOSS OF CONSORTIUM FOR ANY INJURY TO THEIR SPOUSE? 
18 THEY WOULDN'T HAVE NEEDED TO IF LOSS OF 
19 CONSORTIUM EXISTED BEFORE THIS TIME. 
20 AS TO VICTORIA, THAT'S A LOSS OF CONSORTIUM 
21 CLAIM, TOO. OBVIOUSLY IT'S NOT A SPOUSE, BUT WE CITE IN 
22 OUR BRIEF THE DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER CASE WHICH SPECIFICALLY 
23 SAYS THAT UTAH LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ADOPTION OF 
24 CONSORTIUM. UTAH HAS NOT RECOGNIZED ANY CONSORTIUM CLAIM 
25 I THAT ALLOWS RECOVERY BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE 
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•:• . .-v./w INJURIES TO A THIRD PERSON. 
THE PLAINTIFF RELIES FOR THEIR OPPOSITION ON 
THE CASE OF MORTON V. MACFARLANE, V'l'f UOHOP T;.;.- . -.., 
REALLY HAS NO RELEVANCY AT A^ T ™ THIS ISSUE. IN THAT 
CASE, THE HUSBAND AND CHILDREN WERE SUING A DOCTOR FOR 
INTENTIONAL TORT OF ALIENATION i T AFFECTION AND CRIMINAL 
CONVERSION, BECAUSE HE ENTERED INTO A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
MOTHER AND WIFE OF THE PLAINTIFFS. THOSE ARE INTENTIONAL 
TORTS WHTCH HAVE EXISTED IN UTAH. 
NOW THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO DISMISS THOSE 
CLAIMS. ON APPEAL, THE DOCTOR ARGUED THAT IF YOU CAN'T 
HAVE A LOSS OF CONSORTIUM, THEN YOU I'.HOULIiN'T BE ARHE Tn 
RECOVER FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTION 
AND CRIMINAL CONVERSION, TO WHICH THE SUPREME COURT CLEARLY 
MADE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THOSE THEORIES. 
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM IS A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM. 
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM HAS NOT EXISTED IN UTAH FOR S< K: 1 - • . 
INTENTIONAL ALIENATION OF AFFECTION IS AN INTENTIONAL. :\)RT 
WHICH HAS EXISTED. 
SO, YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE IT'S CLEAR THAT 
THERE IS NO LOSS 01'' CONSORTIUM i. I ,A IH IN UTAH AT THE TIME OF 
THIS ACCIDENT. 
THERE WAS AN ARGUMENT THAT THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION ALLOWED A MINOR TO RECOVER, AND THAT THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION ALLOWS A MINOR TO RECOVER ON THE WRONGFUL 
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1 DEATH CLAIM, THE DEATH OF THEIR PARENT. THAT POSITION IS 
2 NOT EVEN CONTAINED IN THEIR OPPOSITION BRIEF, AND BASED ON 
3 THE FOREGOING, I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO DISMISS THE TWO 
4 CLAIMS OF THESE TWO DEFENDANTS. 
5 MR. ROUNDY: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. THOR 
6 ROUNDY APPEARING FOR THE PLAINTIFFS. I WOULD FIRST LIKE TO 
7 MAKE A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ANYTHING I HAVE TO SAY 
8 ABOUT THE PLAINTIFF'S LOSS OF CONSORTIUM WILL BE BRIEF. 
9 FIRST OF ALL, WHAT WE HAVE ON THIS MOTION 
10 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS REALLY A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE 
11 FACTS. 
12 THESE ARE FACTS THAT ARE REALLY FOR THE JURY 
13 TO DECIDE, OR FOR THE TRIER OF FACT. I REALLY DON'T WANT 
14 TO SPEND ANY OF THE COURT'S TIME TALKING ABOUT WHETHER THEY 
15 OWNED THE PROPERTY. I WANT TO LOOK AT THE THINGS THAT 
16 REALLY PREVENT US FROM REACHING ANY POSSIBILITY OF SUMMARY 
17 JUDGMENT AT THIS POINT, AND ONE OF THOSE IS THE FACT THAT, 
18 AS MR. CHRISTENSEN POINTS OUT, IF THESE PEOPLE EXERCISED 
19 SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER THIS PROPERTY ON A DAY-TO-DAY 
20 BASIS, THEN THEY WOULD BE LIABLE AS A LANDLORD FOR ANY 
21 DANGEROUS DEFECTIVE CONDITION THAT EXISTED ON THE PROPERTY. 
22 THE COURT: THAT EXISTED OR DO YOU SAY THEY 
23 DO EXIST? THAT EXISTED OR THAT THEY KNEW EXISTED? 
24 MR. ROUNDY: WELL, AS MR. CHRISTENSEN POINTS 
25 OUT, THE STANDARD IS: DID THEY KNOW? OR, THROUGH THE 
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EXERCISE OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE, COULD THEY HAVE 
DISCOVERED IT? 
AND THAT'S REALLY HIS THIRD POINT. WILL 
BE M'l ".Ei'riNU POINT m y SECOND POINT, WHICH IS GOING TO BE 
MY FIRST ONE, IS THAT THERE IS PLENTY OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW 
THAT THEY HAP DAY-TO-DAY CONTROL. MERE THEY WERE PEOPLE 
LJ • • : • ' : 1 -.OPERTY. 
IF YOU LOOK AT THEIR BRIEF—I HAVE SOME 
EARMARKS OVER HERE; I DON'T Til INK WE NEED l'u LOOE A'l IT, 
c' . •. CHRISTENSEN MENTIONED THAT THEY MOVED THEIR 
MOTHER OUT OF THE PROPERTY. SHE HAD ALZHEIMEF' :- . AND THEY 
DIDN'T WANT HER WANDERING OUT ! "-Hi- >- ;- < 
ROADS. 
SHE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE :: • THINGS THAT WERE 
GOING ON, AND HERE THEY MOVED HEK C ' Thr : NS^ DE A 
DECISION, WITHOUT EVERY CONSULTING HER, WITHOUT TELLING 
HER, "WE ARE RENTING THIS PROPERTY," THEY RENTED THIS 
PROPERTY OUT OVER AND OVER AGAJN. 
THEY HAD FIVE TENANTS IN THREE YEARS ON THE 
PROPERTY, AND THEY DID HAVE A CONTRACT, LANDLORD-TENANT 
CONTRACT, THERE WAP A VERBAL CONTRAC! W I'J H THESE TENANTS. 
THEY WOULD SAY, "YOU PAY THIS MUCH RENT." 
THEY MADE ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS. THEY DID 
ALL I'HE TALKING, YOU KNOW, WE TOOK THEIR DEPOSITIONS AFTER 
THE LAST TIME THERE WAS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HERE, 
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AND IT PRODUCED REALLY JUST OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT THE 
MOTHER KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THIS PROPERTY AND THAT THE KIDS 
DID HAVE DAY-TO-DAY CONTROL OVER THE PROPERTY, ABSOLUTELY. 
IF THE KIDS DIDN'T HAVE DAY-TO-DAY CONTROL 
OVER THE PROPERTY, WHO DID? I MEAN I THINK IF YOU ASK THAT 
QUESTION, IT PUTS IT IN THE LIGHT THAT THERE WAS NOBODY 
ELSE OUT THERE. THESE KIDS WERE DOING EVERYTHING. MOM 
DIDN'T EVEN KNOW THAT THERE WAS A TENANT IN THE PLACE, 
DIDN'T KNOW WHAT THE RENT WAS, DIDN'T KNOW, YOU KNOW, THE 
PEOPLE WHO WERE MOVING IN AND OUT. SHE DIDN'T KNOW 
ANYTHING. 
AND SO AGAIN—AND THIS IS MY OPINION—THERE 
IS NO WAY THAT WE CAN FIND TO THE CONTRARY. 
BUT WHAT WE NEED TO DECIDE HERE TODAY IS: 
IS THERE ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR A JURY TO FIND IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF ON THIS POINT? I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY 
QUESTION BUT THAT THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
TO DECIDE, OR FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF, AND THEREFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PRECLUDED. 
NOW I'LL GO TO THE THIRD POINT, AND THE 
THIRD POINT IS: DID THEY KNOW OR SHOULD THEY HAVE KNOWN? 
ONE OF THE THINGS WE TRIED TO DISCOVER IN 
THIS CASE IS WE TRIED TO GET—AND THE RECORD IN THIS CASE 
WAS THAT THEY DID KNOW, BECAUSE THE TENANTS WHO WERE LIVING 
THERE AT THE TIME HAD TOLD US THAT THEY KNEW. 
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BUT THOSE PEOPLE ARE IN ARGENTINA, AND WE 
GET THEM UP TO TESTIFY. BUT WE DO HAVE AN EXPERT WHO'S 
GOING TO TESTIFY AT THE TRIAL IN THIS CASK ABOUT THE 
DEFECTIVE CONDITION AND WHAT THE CAUSE WAS AND THESE KINDS 
OF THINGS. AND THERE IS REALLY NOT ANY QUESTION THAT IF 
THEY, IN THE COURSE OF THREE YEARS, WHILE RENTTM ' 'VE 
TENANTS, IF THEY HAD STOPPED BY THAT PROPERTY, THEY WOULD 
HAVE SEEN A WINDOW THAT WASN'T CLOSING ALL THE WAY, A 
WTNDOW OPEN, AND THE ROT. 
AND THEY HAD LIVED IN THE PROPERTY A NUMBER 
OF YEARS THEMSELVES. THEY KNEW THAT THERE WAS A BATHROOM 
RIGHT NEXT TM Till.1, WINDOW, AND THE HUMIDITY IS i.'dMlNi, OUT, 
AND ADOLFO ROBLES TESTIFIED THAT BEFORE THE ACCIDENT HE 
EXAMINED THE WINDOW AND THAT THE OTHER TENANT WHO WAS 
LIVING TI1EPF W/Vr. TRYING I'M I J1 |. N || NMIIMI MI- I ll ulKN 'VMOU'I 
THIS FAR, AND WOULD TRY TO GET SOME VENTILATION OR 
WHATEVER, AND THAT FOR TWO DAYS WHILE THEY WERE THERE 
BEFORE THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED, THAT WINDOW BASICALLY MOVED 
UP AND DOWN ABOUT THIS FAR. 
AND THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE TRYING TO GET 
IT OPEN, AND IT WAS V;-.\: DIFFICULT TO OPEN, AND THEY WOULD 
CLOSE IT AT NIGHT, YOU KNOW. BUT THAT WAS—IT WAS AN 
OBVIOUS PROBLEM WITH THE WIN' •:-•[•• • ",HUT ALL THE 
WAY. IT WAS OLD, YOU KNOW; ' i :,v'r .-• L-IECL OK WINDOW 
BREAKING OFF OF IT. 
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AND WE'VE GOT A BROKEN WINDOW. THIS LADY 
TRIED TO OPEN THE WINDOW, AND IT BROKE. I THINK ALL THIS 
EVIDENCE GIVES THE JURY THE OPPORTUNITY TO DECIDE WHETHER 
OR NOT THIS IS A DEFECTIVE CONDITION THAT SOMEBODY WOULD 
HAVE NOTICED IF THEY HAD JUST DONE A REASONABLE JOB OF 
LOOKING AT THIS PROPERTY, MAYBE EVEN JUST ONCE EVERY TIME 
THE TENANT CHANGED, EVEN IF THEY WOULD HAVE COME IN TO LOOK 
TO SEE IF THE PLACE HAD BEEN CLEANED OUT. 
EVEN IF THEY HADN'T TRIED TO OPEN THAT 
WINDOW, THEY COULD HAVE SEEN THAT THE WINDOW WOULDN'T SHUT 
ALL THE WAY. THEY COULD'VE SEEN ALL THESE DIFFERENT 
PROBLEMS. 
WITH JUST REASONABLE AND ORDINARY CARE, 
THESE PEOPLE COULD HAVE KNOWN ABOUT THAT PROBLEM, BECAUSE 
THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE THAT. AND 
FOR THAT REASON, I THINK SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PRECLUDED. 
THE JURY HAS TO DECIDE AS TO REASONABLE CARE. 
THE COURT: THESE PEOPLE, WHAT WAS THE 
STATUS OF THE ROBLESES IN THE PROPERTY? 
MR. ROUNDY: THE ROBLESES WERE GUESTS OF THE 
TENANTS. 
THE COURT: GUESTS? 
MR. ROUNDY: YES, THAT'S RIGHT. 
THE COURT: IS THERE A LESSER STANDARD OF 
CARE TOWARD GUESTS THAN TENANTS? 
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MR. ROUNDY: NOT THAT I'M AWARE OF. FOR ONE 
THING, THERE WAS—WELI : HAD ANOTHER THOUGHT, BU" 
BASICALLY II' fT'S A DANGEROUS CONDITION, '"••'.' . .••... 
HAVE REPAIRED, I DON'T KNOW THAT IT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 
WHETHER IT'S AN INVITEE OR A TENANT WHO'5 INJURED. 
IF THERF, HAS -hi iA'l • <:i. BREACH OF 
THE DUTY OF STANDARD OF CARE, THAT CAUSES THE INJURY, I 
THINK THAT'S A CASE OF NEGLIGENCE THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT. 
"N THIS CA; h .; CERTAINLY NEGLIGENCE. 
LN ANY EVENT, I WILL BE BRIEF NOW WITH THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS. THE CASE THAT THE PLA'V'!"' •• •  •• : 
ON l:.; THE BOUCHER CASE. COUNSEL REFERRED 10 IN i'HE BOUCHER 
CASE THAT THERE WAS A 21-YEAR-OLD ADULT WHO WAS ASKING FOR 
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM. 
THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT THIS WAS A CASE 
OF FIRST IMPRESSION, AND THAT, "WHAT WE'RE NOT GOING TO DO 
IS WE'RE NOT GOING TO DECIDE WH'-'TH'-:- ••. MINOR CHILD"- IN 
THIS CASE WE HAVE A DAUGHTER WHO 1 THINK IS ONE OR TWO 
YEARS OLD WHEN INJURED--"WE'RE NOT GOING TO DECIDE THAT 
ONE." THEY LEFT IT AT THAT. 
I TALKED TO MY CLIENTS ABOUT THIS. I'VE 
SAID, "HEY, THIS IS A LONG SHOT, BUT YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO AT 
LEA •-,- v-,:- • . ., ,. • , ; THROW : IERE 
AN- ..£'3 THE COURT DECIDE WHAT IT WAIi'l ' TO DO WITH : , 
BECAUSE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SAID THAT *wE HAVEN'T REACH 
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1 A DECISION YET.'" 
2 I THINK THAT WE DO RECOGNIZE LOST CONSORTIUM 
3 IN WRONGFUL DEATH CASES, AND THAT THAT MEANS THAT WE HAVE— 
4 THE SUPREME COURT DOESN'T SAY, "IN THE CASE OF WRONGFUL 
5 DEATH, YOU HAVE A RIGHT OF LOSS OF CONSORTIUM," THEY SAY 
6 THAT IN THE WRONGFUL DEATH CASE, YOU SHOULDN'T ELIMINATE 
7 PEOPLE'S CLAIMS BY STATUTE. 
8 SO I THINK SINCE WE'VE RECOGNIZED FILIAL 
9 LOSS OF CONSORTIUM, THERE IS COMMON LAW OUT THERE THAT SAYS 
10 THAT A CHILD HAS A RIGHT TO A CLAIM OF LOSS OF CONSORTIUM. 
11 WE RECOGNIZE THOSE DAMAGES, AND THAT'S WHAT 
12 THE COMMON LAW THAT HAS DEVELOPED IN WRONGFUL DEATH CASES 
13 SAYS. WE KNOW THAT EXISTS IN THE CASE OF A SPOUSE, AND WE 
14 HAVE THE HACKFORD OPINION, AND I'LL TALK ABOUT THAT IN ONE 
15 SECOND VERY BRIEFLY, BUT WHERE WE HAVE A STATUTE THAT'S 
16 GOING TO APPLY TO A SPOUSE. 
17 BUT IN THE CASE OF A CHILD, THERE IS.NO 
18 STATUTE AT ALL THAT WOULD ELIMINATE LOSS OF CONSORTIUM 
19 CLAIMS. SO I THINK THAT THE 20-YEAR-OLD'S CLAIM AT THIS 
20 POINT OUGHT TO BE RECOGNIZED IN THE UTAH LAW, BUT WE'LL NOT 
21 MAKE ANY ARGUMENT BEYOND THAT AT THIS POINT AS TO HER 
22 CLAIM. 
23 BECAUSE LIKE I SAY, WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THIS 
24 IS A LONG SHOT, PERHAPS, AS A CLAIM FOR HER, BUT I THINK 
25 THAT IT'S FAIR AND IT'S A RIGHT, AND I THINK OF THE 
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INJURIES THAT SHE SUFFERED ARE PERSONAL TO HER, AND THEY 
ARE NOT CLAIMS THAT BELONG TO HER MOTHER. 
I THINK THE SAME IS TRUE—I'LL BRIEFLY 
ADDRESS THE HACKFORD DECISION—WITH RESPECT TO THE SPOUSE. 
THESE ARE CLAIMS PERSONAL TO HIM. THE TWO DISSENTING 
JUSTICES IN HACKFORD EXPRESSED VERY QUERISOME REASONS WHY 
THERE SHOULD BE A LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM FOR A SPOUSE. 
HACKFORD WAS A PLURALITY DECISION, JUSTICE 
ZIMMERMAN BEING THE ONLY ONE WHO WENT INTO A DESCRIPTION OF 
HOW THE STATUTE PRECLUDED THIS LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM. 
I THINK COUNSEL MENTIONED WITH THE NEW 
STATUTE WE HAVE OUT, I THINK WITH A LOOK AT THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WHERE THERE IS A DIVORCE AND THE 
HUSBAND DOES NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RECOVER FOR LOSS OF 
CONSORTIUM THROUGH THE CLAIMS OF THE WIFE, THAT THAT IS 
SOMETHING—AND AGAIN, I HAVE TOLD HIM THAT THIS IS A LONG 
SHOT—BUT THAT WE OUGHT TO AT LEAST PRESENT IT, TO HAVE AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT IT. 
WE WILL LET THE JUDGE DECIDE WHAT HE WANTS 
TO DO WITH IT. I THINK THAT THERE IS—I TOLD MY CLIENTS 
THAT, "AS LONG AS WE—WE OUGHT TO GIVE YOU THE RIGHT TO 
MAKE AN ARGUMENT, IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO DO THAT, THAT SINCE 
YOU CAN'T RECOVER THROUGH YOUR SPOUSE, THAT THE SUPREME 
COURT IS GOING TO LOOK AT THE SITUATION OF YOUR RIGHTS, 
THAT THERE ARE GOING TO BE SITUATIONS WHERE YOU CAN RECOVER 
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1 THROUGH YOUR SPOUSE AS A PERSONAL CLAIM," TO MR. ROBLES, 
2 AND AS A CONCLUSION, WE'LL LEAVE THAT CONSORTIUM ISSUE IN 
3 THE COURT'S HANDS. THANK YOU. 
4 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
5 BY MR. CHRISTENSEN: 
6 LET ME WORK BACKWARDS AND START WITH THE 
7 MOTION TO DISMISS. ESSENTIALLY WHAT MR. ROUNDY IS ASKING 
8 THIS COURT TO DO IS TO IGNORE HACKFORD, BECAUSE IT HAS SOME 
9 DISSENTING OPINIONS, AND TO FIND THAT THERE SHOULD BE A 
10 LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM HERE FOR MR. ROBLES. 
11 ESSENTIALLY HE'S ASKING YOU TO MAKE NEW LAW, 
12 AND I DON'T THINK THAT'S WHAT TRIAL COURTS WANT TO BE 
13 DOING. HACKFORD IS CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO LOSS OF 
14 CONSORTIUM SPOUSE-TO-SPOUSE IN THE STATE OF UTAH IN 1993. 
15 SECONDLY, AS TO THE MINOR CHILD, BOUCHER WAS 
16 VERY CLEAR WHEN IT SAID THAT UTAH LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
17 ADOPTION OF LOSS OF FILIAL CONSORTIUM. AND IT GOES ON TO 
18 SAY THAT THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH, HOWEVER, HAS NOT 
19 RECOGNIZED ANY—IT SAYS ANY CONSORTIUM CLAIM THAT ALLOWS 
20 RECOVERY BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE RESULTED IN THE 
21 NON-FATAL INJURIES OF A THIRD PERSON. 
22 IT CAN'T GET ANY CLEARER THAN THAT, YOUR 
23 HONOR. NOW MR. ROUNDY WOULD LIKE THE COURT TO ADOPT THE 
24 ARGUMENT THAT, "WELL, BECAUSE YOU MAY BE ABLE TO GET LOSS 
25 OF CONSORTIUM IN A WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM, THEN YOU SHOULD BE 
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ABLE TO DO THE SAME THING." 
THIS ISN'T A WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM. WE HAVE 
A SPECIFIC STATUTE THAT GIVES HEIRS THE RIGHT TO PURSUE 
CLAIMS AGAINST THE TORTIOUS THIRD PARTY WHO KILLS, YOU 
KNOW, THE PRINCIPAL WHO HAS BEEN KILLED. 
WHY DO YOU BRING A WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM? 
BECAUSE YOU LOST THAT PERSON. THAT'S THE VERY ABSENCE, I 
GUESS, OF LOSS OF CONSORTIUM. OF COURSE THE HEIR WASN'T 
INJURED, BUT THAT'S NOT THE CASE. 
THAT'S A SEPARATE LEGAL THEORY. WRONGFUL 
DEATH IS A SEPARATE LEGAL THEORY. THIS IS A CASE WHERE 
MONICA ROBLES' PARENT AND EX-WIFE WERE STILL ALIVE. SHE IS 
STILL ALIVE. SHE IS STILL ALIVE. SHE WAS INJURED. THERE 
IS NO LOSS OF CONSORTIUM THAT EITHER OF THESE TWO PEOPLE 
SUFFERED. 
IF I COULD GO TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT—WELL, THE OTHER QUESTION ON THAT PARTICULAR 
MOTION? IF YOU DO, I'LL BE HAPPY TO RESPOND. 
THE COURT: I THINK THERE ARE TWO ISSUES: 
THE QUESTION OF CONTROL OVER THE PROPERTY, AND THE QUESTION 
OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFECT, AND THE STATUS OF A TENANT OR 
GUEST, IF THERE'S A DIFFERENT STANDARD OF PROOF. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: LET ME TAKE THE LAST 
QUESTION, YOUR HONOR. I HAVEN'T LOOKED INTO THAT TOO 
CLOSELY. I WASN'T TRYING TO RAISE A NEW ARGUMENT THERE. I 
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1 WANTED THE COURT TO BE AWARE THAT IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING 
2 THAT IF THEY'RE GUESTS IN THE PROPERTY, THAT IT WOULD BE—I 
3 DON'T KNOW THAT IT WOULD BE THE SAME STANDARD. I'M NOT 
4 AWARE OF ANY INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE GIVEN WHERE YOU'RE NOT 
5 ALLOWED TO HAVE SOMEBODY ELSE COME IN AND STAY WITH YOU. 
6 BUT WHY I WAS MAKING THAT POINT GOES TO THE 
7 SECOND ISSUE, WHICH IS: DO THEY KNOW ABOUT THE DEFECT? 
8 FIRST OF ALL, LET ME ADDRESS HIS POINT THAT 
9 THEY NOW HAVE AN EXPERT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I HAVE 
10 HEARD ABOUT THIS. UP UNTIL NOW WE HAVE NEVER KNOWN WHAT 
11 THE DEFECT WAS. ALL WE KNEW WAS THAT THERE WAS A BROKEN 
12 WINDOW. 
13 THE COURT: IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE OF WHAT HE 
14 SAYS AS FAR AS WHAT THE DEFECT IS? 
15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: NONE. IN HIS OPPOSITION 
16 BRIEF, THERE IS—IF YOU LOOK AT IT, THERE IS NOT ONE WORD 
17 ABOUT ACCIDENT OR IN ANY WAY ABOUT WHAT THE DEFECT WAS. IF 
18 HE'S SUGGESTING HE'S GOING TO PUT FORTH AN EXPERT HERE, 
19 HERE WE ARE TWO WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL, YOUR HONOR. 
20 THAT'S WHY WE FILED THIS DISPOSITIVE MOTION. 
21 HE HAD NO EXPERTS. THEN HE JUST STANDS UP HERE AND BLANKLY 
22 SAYS, "I HAVE AN EXPERT." 
23 WE DON'T KNOW WHAT HE'S GOING TO SAY. SOME 
24 TIME AGO, YOUR HONOR, GOING ALL THE WAY BACK TO JUNE OF 
25 1995, WE HAD DISCOVERY RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE 
25 
PLAINTIFF. 
THE VERY QUESTION WAS ASKED FOR HIM TO LIST 
ANY EXPERT—THIS IS UNDER NO. 42—ANY EXPERT OR OTHER 
PERSON WHOM YOU WILL RELY ON IN—WELL, EXCUSE ME, THAT IS 
ON THE INJURY CLAIM. I DON'T HAVE IT IN FRONT OF ME. WE 
ASKED OUR DISCOVERY, A REQUEST FOR THEM TO LIST EXPERTS, AS 
IS TYPICALLY DONE, AND IT WAS MY RECOLLECTION THAT THEIR 
RESPONSE WAS, "WE DON'T KNOW YET." 
AND I'LL REPRESENT TO THE COURT THIS IS THE 
FIRST TIME I HAVE HEARD OF AN EXPERT. I DON'T THINK 
COUNSEL WOULD DISAGREE. HAVE YOU EVER TOLD US ABOUT 
YOUR—. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, COUNSEL. ADDRESS THE 
COURT. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I APOLOGIZE. ON APRIL THE 
18TH, 1997, I SENT COUNSEL A LETTER ASKING FOR A LIST OF 
HIS WITNESSES. I HAVEN'T RECEIVED THEM, YOUR HONOR. 
IF HE'S GOING TO PUT FORWARD EVIDENCE THAT 
THERE WAS A DEFECT DUE TO THIS, AND WE'VE GET AN EXPERT TO 
TALK ABOUT IT, HE SHOULD HAVE DONE IT IN HIS OPPOSITION 
BRIEF. THAT HASN'T BEEN DONE. I THINK THE ISSUE IS 
CLEARLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
THE ISSUE IS: THERE WAS NO DEFECT. HE 
CAN'T RELY UPON SOME EXPERT THAT WE KNOW NOTHING ABOUT AT 
ALL TO CREATE AN ISSUE OF FACT. 
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1 NOW LET ME FINISH ON THE ISSUE ON THE AMOUNT 
2 OF CONTROL. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PUT FORTH BY HIM THAT MY 
3 CLIENTS WERE EVER COMPENSATED. HE'S NEVER CHALLENGED THE 
4 CASE LAW THAT WE CITED THAT SAYS YOU DON'T BECOME 
5 ESSENTIALLY A LANDLORD UNLESS YOU'RE AN INDEPENDENT 
6 CONTRACTOR, THAT THIS IS THE ONLY PROPERTY, THAT YOU EITHER 
7 OWN IT OR ARE AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. 
8 WHAT WE HAVE IS VOLUNTEERS HERE. HE SAID, 
9 "WELL," AND HAS JUST POSED THE QUESTION OF WHO CONTROLLED 
10 THE DAY-TO-DAY, THE DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE PROPERTY 
11 IF THE MOTHER WAS INCAPACITATED? 
12 WELL, PERHAPS NOBODY EVEN CONTROLLED IT. IS 
13 THAT MY CLIENT'S FAULT? NO, THEIR MOTHER BECOMES 
14 INCAPACITATED, THEY HELP OUT AS BEST THEY CAN BECAUSE THE 
15 OWNER DIDN'T MAKE PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS TO HAVE SOME SORT OF A 
16 MANAGEMENT COMPANY COME IN AND SELL THE HOUSE OR DO SOME 
17 MANAGEMENT OF IT. THAT'S NOT OUR CLIENT'S FAULT. 
18 BECAUSE THERE WAS A LACK OF CONTROL OVER 
19 THIS PROPERTY DOES NOT MAKE OUR CLIENTS LIABLE AS 
20 VOLUNTEERS WHO DO THIS. I'LL SUBMIT IT. 
21 THE COURT: IF THEY BECOME AGENTS, IS THE 
22 AGENT LIABLE AS THE PRINCIPAL? 
23 MR. CHRISTENSEN: AS I STATED BEFORE, YOUR 
24 HONOR, THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, SPECIFICALLY SAYS—AND I 
25 QUOTE IT HERE IN MY BRIEF—FOR THERE TO BE AGENCY, AN 
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1 AGENCY RELATIONSHIP, THERE MUST BE MANIFEST CONSENT BETWEEN 
2 THE PRINCIPAL AND THE AGENT. SO IF THE COURT, FOR EXAMPLE 
3 IN THIS CASE, THEY HAVE TO PROVE THAT THE MOTHER ASKED THE 
4 CHILDREN TO ACT ON HER BEHALF AS HER AGENT AND MANAGE THIS 
5 PROPERTY. 
6 YOU LOOK AT ALL THE CASES THAT WE'VE CITED, 
7 AND IT'S THE SAME TYPE OF DEAL. YOU HAVE AN OWNER ASKING A 
8 MANAGEMENT COMPANY TO COME IN AND ACT ON THEIR BEHALF. THE 
9 MANAGEMENT COMPANY COMES IN AND TAKES OVER COMPLETE CONTROL 
10 OF THIS PROPERTY, THE DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF IT. THAT 
11 MAKES THEM LIABLE. 
12 IN THIS CASE, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE, JUST THAT 
13 EVELYN BOLTON'S DEAD. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF HER GIVING 
14 CONSENT TO THEM TO TAKE CARE OF THE PROPERTY FOR HER, 
15 ASSIST HER IN MAINTAINING THE PROPERTY; NONE OF IT. 
16 MY TWO CLIENTS HAVE SAID THAT THEY INITIALLY 
17 TOOK IT UPON THEMSELVES, THEY HAD AN -INCAPACITATED MOTHER, 
18 "WE HAD PROPERTY, WE WOULD"--. 
19 THE COURT: DID THEY HAVE AN IMPLIED AGENCY? 
20 MR. CHRISTENSEN: WELL, I HAVEN'T RESEARCHED 
21 THAT, YOUR HONOR. HE DIDN'T ARGUE IT. HE SAID, "WE HAVE 
22 AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP." SO I DON'T HAVE AN ANSWER TO 
23 THAT. 
24 THE COURT: WELL, COUNSEL, FIRST OF ALL, AS 
25 FAR AS THE MOTION TO DISMISS, THE COURT WOULD GRANT THE 
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. I DON'T THINK UTAH DOES 
REPRESENT, OR DID RECOGNIZE AT THAT TIME, ANY LOSS OF 
CONSORTIUM AS FAR AS A HUSBAND OR AS FAR AS A DAUGHTER WAS 
CONCERNED, AND THE COURT WOULD GRANT THAT MOTION. 
THE COURT WOULD ALSO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT 
DID NOT OWN THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. IT 
WAS STILL OWNED BY THE MOTHER; EVEN THOUGH A DEED HAD BEEN 
PREPARED, IT HAD NOT BEEN DELIVERED, AND WITHOUT DELIVERY 
OF A DEED, OWNERSHIP WOULD NOT HAVE CHANGED. 
NOW TWO QUESTIONS WHICH THE COURT HAS ASKED, 
WHICH HAVE CONCERNED THE COURT, ARE THE QUESTION ABOUT 
CONTROL OVER THE PROPERTY BY THE DEFENDANT AND KNOWLEDGE OF 
DEFECTS, OR SHOULD THEY HAVE KNOWN OF A DANGEROUS 
CONDITION? 
I HAVE ASKED QUESTIONS AS FAR AS AGENCY 
RELATIONSHIP. I HAVE QUESTIONS AS FAR AS GUESTS ARE 
CONCERNED. THE COURT IS NOT ABSOLUTELY SURE ON SOME OF 
THESE, BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THE DEFENDANT BECAME AN 
AGENT OF THE MOTHER IN CONTROLLING THAT PROPERTY. 
I THINK THAT THEY WERE VOLUNTARILY PLACED IN 
THAT POSITION TO LOOK AFTER THE PROPERTY AS THEIR MOTHER 
WAS IN A REST HOME, APPARENTLY SENILE; THAT THEY DID ASSUME 
THAT RESPONSIBILITY. 
I THINK THAT ANY DAMAGE THAT MAY HAVE 
RESULTED WOULD BE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE MOTHER OR 
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AGAINST HER ESTATE. 
NOW THE QUESTION AS FAR AS THE KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE DEFECT, COUNSEL'S ARGUED THAT HE HAS AN EXPERT THAT'S 
GOING TO TELL WHAT THE DEFECT IS. I'VE SEEN NOTHING IN ANY 
OF THE PLEADINGS THAT ARE BEFORE THE COURT NOW, AND THAT'S 
THE ONLY THING THE COURT CAN RULE ON, BUT ANY EXPERT SAYS 
ANYTHING AS TO WHAT THE DEFECT OF THAT WINDOW WAS, WHETHER 
THERE WAS ANY KNOWN BY THE DEFENDANTS, WHETHER IT WAS 
APPARENT AS A DEFECT, EXCEPT THAT IT WAS AN OLD HOME AND 
THE WINDOWS DIDN'T OPERATE AS SMOOTHLY AS NEW WINDOWS 
SHOULD HAVE, OR THEY WOULD HAVE LIKED THEM TO HAVE 
OPERATED, OR THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING UNUSUAL AS FAR AS AN 
OLD HOME SHOULD BE CONCERNED. 
THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION, AND I SO RULE, 
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFECT, THAT NO 
COMPLAINTS OR KNOWLEDGE HAD BEEN IMPARTED TO THEM OF ANY 
DEFECT, AND THEY HAD NO REASON TO KNOW THAT THIS PARTICULAR 
WINDOW WAS DEFECTIVE. THEY KNEW THE HOUSE WAS OLD, THAT 
EVERYTHING WAS OLD IN THE HOME, AND THEY'D HAVE NO 
KNOWLEDGE AS TO THIS PARTICULAR WINDOW BEING IN ANY 
DEFECTIVE CONDITION. 
NOW I'M NOT SURE OF THIS, BUT MY BEST 
RECOLLECTION OF THE LAW IS THAT ALSO THE STANDARD IS NOT AS 
HIGH TOWARD GUESTS AS IT WOULD BE TOWARD A TENANT, BUT I'M 
NOT MAKING A RULING ON THAT. IN FACT I PROBABLY SHOULDN'T 
30 
1 EVEN HAVE STATED IT. I WON'T WANT ANYTHING IN THE FINDINGS 
2 ABOUT THAT BECAUSE I'M NOT SURE. 
3 BUT I WOULD BASE THE ORDER ON WHAT I HAVE 
4 SAID. I WOULD GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. I 
5 WOULD ALSO GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
6 JUDGMENT. ANYTHING FURTHER? 
7 MR. CHRISTENSEN: YOUR HONOR, MAY I PREPARE 
8 THE ORDER? 
9 THE COURT: YOU MAY. AND THIS WILL STRIKE 
10 THE TRIAL DATE. THANK YOU. 
11 (WHEREUPON, AT THE HOUR OF 9:45 A.M., THE 
1 2 II PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.) 
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from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Rule 55. Default 
(a) Default 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim-
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
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ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C JV. 1953, 
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circum-
stances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases 
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy 
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar. 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless 
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a 
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict ac-
companied by answers to interrogatories returned by 
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith 
signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided 
in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of 
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in regis-
ter of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is 
complete and shall be deemed entered for all pur-
poses, except the creation of a lien on real property, 
when the same is signed and filed as herein above 
provided. The clerk shall immediately make a nota-
tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the 
judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The 
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of 
this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party 
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact 
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
rendered thereon. 
(0 Judgment by confession. Whenever a judg-
ment by confession is authorized by statute, the party 
seeking the same must file with the clerk of the court 
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, 
verified by the defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money 
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the 
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the 
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contin-
gent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not ex-
ceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for 
a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the state-
ment, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment 
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of 
entry, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judg-
ment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any 
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, 
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor 
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed 
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within 
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly ac-
knowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by ac-
knowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the 
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the 
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the 
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satis-
faction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more 
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming 
them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judg-
ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of 
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall 
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was 
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof, 
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the 
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered 
upon the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction 
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the 
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, 
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also 
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, in-
cluding the amount paid, on the margin of the judg-
ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfac-
tion. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall 
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any 
judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon 
the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the 
extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to 
be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execu-
tion shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such 
execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of 
such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to 
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from 
the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other 
counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall 
have been entered on the judgment docket of the 
county where such judgment was first docketed, a 
certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by 
the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with 
the clerk of the district court in any other county 
where the judgment may have been docketed. There-
upon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be 
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall 
have the same effect as in the county where the same 
was originally entered. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the follow-
ing causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a 
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and con-
clusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
EXAMINATION BY MR. CHRISTENSEN 
Q Now, this window, did it have handles on 
the bottom of it? 
A No. 
Q Okay. Did she tell you whether the bottom 
frame of the window when she tried to open it, 
whether it initially had been depressed down into the 
wood casing? 
A I don't know. 
Q Okay. Did you have any discussion with her 
as to how she got her hands underneath this wood 
frame, if in fact the frame had been depressed down 
into the casing? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Okay. Now, you were about to tell me that 
at some point, you took a look at this window. And 
you made some observations, correct? 
A I was the one who changed the glass. 
Q Okay. 
A After it was broken. 
Q When was that? 
A The day after the accident. 
Q At that time, what did you observe, what 
did you do with the window? Other than change the 
glass? 
A Well, I observed that it was a very old 
53 
MARY D. QUINN CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 
— » i 1
 lt ^  ^ 
EXAMINATION BY MR. CHRISTENSEN 
window. And it was rotten. 
Q What was rotten? 
A The frame. The window frame. Not the 
window case but the window frame. 
Q How was it rotten? 
A I don't understand your question. 
Q You said it was rotten. What do you mean? 
A It was rotten. Like -- looks like to me 
that probably the humidity from the inside and water 
from the outside, maybe because of the rain, caused 
that thing. Caused the wood was going to -- rotten. 
Q Was it falling apart? 
A A little bit. 
Q How so? 
A I -- well --
Q Did any of the wood fall off the frame? 
A Yes. Actually, yes. From the -- from the 
very — 
Q How --
A From the very corners of the window. 
Q Of the frame or the casing? 
A The frame. 
Q How much wood fell off? 
A After the accident? 
Q Yes. 
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1 A Probably this window -- this thing fell off 
2 before. 
3 Q Okay. What did you see that had fallen off 
4 the frame? 
5 A For example, when I try to -- when I had 
6 removed the pieces of glasses from the accident — 
7 after the accident, I tried to level the window a 
8 little bit more, you know, for me to work to get the 
9 window, the whole window. When I pulled my hands, I 
10 remember that a little bit of the window came out of 
11 the -- of the wood came out. 
12 Q Okay. How much is a little bit? Like a 
13 sliver? 
14 A No. More than that. 
15 Q Was it actual paint? 
16 A One-eighth of a piece of wood. One-eighth 
17 of an inch of wood. Like this. 
18 Q You're pointing out a piece of wood that's 
19 what, about how long? You tell me how long it was. 
20 A The thickness I think it was. The 
21 thickness was like one-eighth. 
22 Q And an eighth of an inch thick by how long? 
23 A Maybe -- maybe half an inch. 
24 Q So a piece of wood an eighth of an inch 
25 thick and half an inch long came off the bottom of 
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the wood frame when you were trying to repair the 
glass, correct? 
A I think so. 
Q Okay. Anything else come off that frame? 
A Well, looks to me that -- looked to me that 
in the past, the window used to have kind of a -- is 
it caulk? 
Q Caulking? 
A Caulking. Because -- I say this because 
there was only a little bit that was totally dry. 
And it was coming apart from there. And the window 
was only being -- being held by some nails, 
Q The glass, you mean? 
A The glass. The glass was only held by some 
piece of nail, 
Q Let's take this caulking. Was the caulking 
around the outside edge of the frame of the window? 
A No. From the inside of the window. 
Q The caulking was around the glass? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. 
A Apparently, it was there. I mean — 
Q Okay. Anything else that you observed? 
A Well, it was also hard for me to open it --
the window. And then close it. 
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Q Okay. 
A It was hard to --
Q But you were able to open and close it? 
A Yes. After much effort, I did. 
Q Now, this window, was it an interior 
window, then there was a window on the other side? 
On the outside? 
A No. 
Q So if you opened up this window, you had 
access to the outside? 
A Outside. 
Q Okay. As you tried to open and shut — 
close this window, how much effort did you have to 
exert? 
A A lot. 
Q Okay. Did you have to shake the window as 
you were opening? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Do you know what caused that glass 
to break? 
A I don't know. 
Q Okay. Had you ever seen your wife try to 
open a window in that house before? 
A No. 
Q Had you seen anybody try to open a window 
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1 in that house before? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Who? 
4 A Mr. Escalante. 
5 Q When was that? 
6 A Before the accident. 
7 Q Which window was that? 
8 A The same window that Monica had the 
9 accident. 
10 Q What date was that? 
11 A I don't know. 
12 Q So he actually opened that particular 
13 window that she had opened? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Why was he doing that? 
16 A Because it was too hot in the house. In 
17 that particular area of the house, there's no air. 
18 It doesn't go — the air doesn't circulate. And --
19 but the — the windows is also -- I guess it was also 
20 a problem with the windows in the front of the house 
21 in the kitchen. Because it couldn't be opened 
22 either. So --
23 Q You tried to open these windows? 
24 A Never. 
25 J Q How did you know there was a problem? 
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1 A Because I guess they -- they told me that 
2 those windows could not be opened, because it was 
3 kind of a -- hard to open. The only one they could 
4 actually open, one was -- Mr. Escalante was the only 
5 one who could open the one to the side. 
6 Q I thought you told me before this accident, 
7 you hadn't had a discussion with the Escalantes about 
8 the windows. 
9 A I didn't have. About that window, didn't 
10 have a discussion. 
11 Q Had you had a discussion about other 
12 windows with the Escalantes? 
13 A They mentioned to me the only windows they 
14 couldn't open was the front -- the front window. The 
15 front door window. 
16 Q When was that that they said that to you? 
17 A After the accident. 
18 Q After the accident, Mr. Escalante said to 
19 you, "You can't open the front windows"? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q But before this accident, you're telling me 
22 that you saw Mr. Escalante open that particular 
23 window, the one in question? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q The one that injured your wife? 
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A It was a little bit open. 
Q Pardon? 
A It was a little bit open. 
Q Did you see him open it, or you saw it 
open? 
A I saw it open. 
Q You did not see Mr. Escalante or anybody 
else open it? 
A I saw Mr. Escalante open the window, yes, I 
did. 
Q He was able to open it? 
A With a lot of effort, yes. 
Q What do you mean? 
A Well, he had to play with the window, 
trying to pull up again. 
Q Okay. 
A Is that understandable? 
Q Yes. How many days before the accident did 
you see this? 
A Maybe it was two days before the accident 
happened. 
Q But the window held? Nothing broke? 
A No. Nothing broke. 
Q Okay. 
A But it was just a tiny bit open. It was 
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1 not a lot open. 
2 Q Okay. 
3 A Just maybe an inch open. From -- one inch 
4 from one side. Because it was like this. 
5 Q When you say like this, you're pointing at 
6 an angle? 
7 A At an angle, yes. I guess the — the 
8 bottom -- the bottom right angle was — can I say 
9 more open than the left. Because it got stuck every 
10 time you tried to open the window. 
11 Q How do you know that? You didn't try to 
12 open it before the accident, right? 
13 A I never tried to open. I --
14 Q You're guessing before this accident, it 
15 would get stuck as it was opened, correct? 
16 A I was guessing? I am guessing? Is that 
17 what you mean? 
18 Q You never tried to open this window before 
19 the accident; is that right? 
20 A I actually tried to open, yes. 
21 Q You tried to open this window before the 
22 accident? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Okay. 
25 A But I --
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1 Q When was that? 
2 A I couldn't open, 
3 Q When was that before the accident you tried 
4 to open it? 
5 A I guess the following day after I saw the 
6 window open. In the morning. 
7 Q So it had been shut again? 
8 A It was shut. 
9 Q Okay. So the day after you saw Mr. 
10 Escalante open it an inch or so, you went back to the 
11 window, and it was shut, correct? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Then you tried to open it; is that right? 
14 A Yes. Because it was so hot inside, yes. 
15 Q What time of day was this? 
16 A Maybe 8, 9. After everybody took a shower 
17 and left. 
18 Q Okay. How did you open it? 
19 A I -- with a lot of effort. But I was 
20 not — since I couldn't open it, because it was stuck 
21 again, I left it there. 
22 Q Well, you just described for me that the 
23 wood frame was depressed down into the wood casing, 
24 correct? It wasn't open at all? 
25 A When? 
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1 
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6 
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10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q When you tried to open it. 
A I guess. I don't -- I don't know. 
Q In other words, you couldn't -- there was 
no opening at the bottom of the wood frame? 
A It was a little bit, yes. That's the 
reason I was able to open. Because the day before, 
Mrs. Escalante opened the door. When tried to shut 
it, shut completely, it couldn't. So next day when I 
try also to open a window, I saw the light there. 
You can put my hands through. So I left it up a 
little bit. 
Q I thought you said you couldn't open it at 
all. You were able to open it a little bit? 
A A little bit more than it was before. The 
night before. 
Q Did you ultimately close it again? 
A I left it there. I don't know. 
Q Okay. At that time, did you think there 
was a problem with the window? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Of course. 
Did you tell anybody about it? 
Yes. 
Who? 
I think I told Juan. 
You think? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Did you, or didn't you? 
3 A I think I make a comment with him. 
4 Q What did you say to him? 
5 A Well, eventually I said to him it was very 
6 hard to open that window. 
7 Q How old was Juan? 
8 A Again? 
9 Q How old was Juan? 
10 A How old was he? 
11 Q Yes. 
12 A I think he was like 34, 35. 
13 Q Is this one of the children, Escalante 
14 children? 
15 A No. I was talking to the father. 
16 Q His name was Juan? 
17 A Juan too. 
18 Q Okay. What exactly did you say to him? 
19 A I don't recall what exactly I told him. 
20 But I think I told him that it was hard to open that 
21 window. 
22 Q What did he say? 
23 A He agreed. 
24 Q Okay. Did either of you try to contact 
25 Evelyn Bolton about the problem with the window? 
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